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 INTRODUCTION 
When does attorney–client privilege protect communications 
between an attorney and her client’s former employee? Unfortunately, there 
is no simple answer to this question. In federal courts, privilege over 
communications with current employees is generally governed by the 
subject-matter test.1 Under this legal doctrine, communication is privileged 
when it regards subject matter within the scope of the employee’s position. 
The rationale for the doctrine is that it is often the lower-level employees 
who will have the information that an attorney needs. Extending the 
doctrine to former employees, however, has caused courts to stumble as 
they have attempted to reconcile evidentiary privilege and the corporate 
entity. The difficulty reconciling these two theories has resulted in a split 
among courts as to what the scope of privilege should be with former 
employees. 
Attorneys will increasingly face circumstances where 
communication with a former employee is necessary. This is a function of 
at least three trends. First, the workforce turnover rate is significantly 
higher for the current generation than it was for past generations.2 Second, 
the backlog of cases in federal courts is continuing to grow, increasing the 
median wait-time.3 And third, the increasingly complex regulatory 
environment that businesses operate in makes it necessary for corporate 
attorneys to access a wide range of corporate knowledge in order to give 
fully informed legal advice.4 The consequence is that an employee is more 
                                                
 1. See generally 1 Paul R. Rice, ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES 
§ 4:14 (2011); John W. Gergacz, ATTORNEY–CLIENT § 3:94 (3d ed. 2013). 
 2. Susan J. Becker, Discovery of Information and Documents from a Litigant’s 
Former Employees: Synergy and Synthesis of Civil Rules, Ethical Standards, Privilege 
Doctrines, & Common Law Principles, 81 NEB. L. REV. 868, 872 (2003) (citing Peralta v. 
Cendant Corp., 190 F.R.D. 38, 39 (D. Conn. 1999)); Jakob v. Champion Int’l Corp., No. 01 
C 0497, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19019, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2011); see also Lindsay 
Gellman, Millenials: Love Them or Let Them Go, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-employers-wrangle-restless-millennials-1430818203 
(reporting that the median job tenure is declining). 
 3. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT 
STATISTICS (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-court-management-
statistics-december-2014 [https://perma.cc/HV32-4HH5] (listing median time from filing to 
trial for civil cases in U.S. District Courts as 26.3 months). 
 4. See Samuel W. Cooper, Guideposts for Handling Corporate Investigations, 41 
LITIG. 30, 30 (2015); Michel Rosenfeld, The Transformation of the Attorney–Client 
Privilege: In Search of an Ideological Reconciliation of Individualism, the Adversary 
System, & the Corporate Client’s Sec Disclosure Obligations, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 495, 542-44 
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likely to leave before an attorney speaks with him and employees that have 
left are more likely to have information that is necessary for the corporate 
attorney. 
There are currently three different approaches that courts have 
taken to the issue of corporate attorney–client privilege with former 
employees. This has resulted in some courts treating former employees no 
differently than any third-party witness, while some have extended 
privilege to only information gathering communications, and still others 
have extended protection to the same extent as current employees. This note 
proposes that the inconsistency is a symptom of the tension between three 
variables: corporate attorney–client doctrine, evidentiary privilege rationale, 
and the corporate-entity theory. Furthermore, this note concludes that 
extending privilege to former employees under the subject-matter test is the 
most logically sound approach. 
To this end, Part I of this note provides a brief overview of how 
evidentiary privilege theory, corporate-entity theory, and the corporate 
attorney–client privilege developed. Part II categorizes and describes the 
three divergent approaches that courts have taken to assertions of privilege 
with former employees, and Part III explains how these divergent 
approaches reveal the tension between corporate-entity theory and 
evidentiary doctrine. Finally, this note concludes by suggesting that the 
most theoretically and doctrinally sound approach is to apply the privilege 
to communication with former employees to the same extent that the 
privilege is applied to communications with current employees. 
I. THEORY AND DOCTRINE 
A. Evidentiary Privilege Rationale 
The adversarial system of adjudication has always allowed limited 
exceptions to the general rule that “the public has a right to every man’s 
evidence.”5 The attorney–client privilege is one of the oldest of these 
exceptions, dating to the time of Queen Elizabeth I.6 At that time, 
protecting the communication between a lawyer and his client was justified 
as an outgrowth of the attorney’s honor-bound ethical duty to protect the 
                                                                                                             
(1982); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“If 
an agent knows or has reason to know a fact, notice of the fact is imputed to the principal for 
purposes of determining the principal’s legal relations with third parties . . . .”). 
 5. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 n.8 (1996). 
 6. Douglas C. Rennie, Why the Beginning Should Be the End: The Argument for 
Exempting Postcomplaint Materials from Rule 26(b)(5)(A)’s Privilege Log Requirement, 85 
TUL. L. REV. 109, 118 (2010). 
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rights of his client.7 Under this justification, disclosure of a client’s 
communication was considered a betrayal of the inherent right that a client 
had to trust his attorney. While attorney–client privilege has remained a 
fundamental component of the adversarial system, the justification for it has 
since shifted to a more limited, instrumental rationale. 
1. The Instrumental Rationale for Evidentiary Privilege 
By the mid-nineteenth century, the justification given for attorney–
client privilege reflected a preference for the needs of the court over the 
rights of clients. 8 According to this “instrumental” rationale, privilege is 
only justified when its practical benefit outweighs the high cost of 
obstructing the court’s search for the truth. Starting with the assumption 
that the “average layperson is so fearful that [a] revelation will later come 
back to haunt him or her . . . that he or she would not make the revelation 
without the assurance of confidentiality,” the instrumental rationale treats 
privilege as a necessary evil.9 
Professor J. Wigmore articulated what has perhaps become the 
most enduring test for the application of attorney–client privilege.10 In his 
judgment, communications should be protected only where the client: (1) 
seeks legal advice; (2) from a professional legal adviser; (3) for the purpose 
of obtaining legal advice; and the communication is (4) made in confidence 
(5) by the client.11 Because privilege is in derogation of the truth-seeking 
nature of the adversarial system, Wigmore urged courts to narrowly 
construe its application, stating that the benefits of evidentiary privilege 
“are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction . . . plain and concrete.” 12 
U.S. courts have since adopted Wigmore’s test and conservative 
construction, citing him as boilerplate in any decision on evidentiary 
privilege.13 
                                                
 7. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
 8. Id. § 2291; Note, The Attorney–Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, & 
Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 465 (1977) [hereinafter Fixed Rules]; see 
also Rochester City Bank v. Suydam, Sage & Co., 5 How. Pr. 254, 257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851) 
(“[C]ounsel and sometimes courts have talked about the impropriety of disclosing that which 
was communicated in confidence . . . as if the betrayal of a trust, or confidence reposed, had 
something to do with the matter . . . . [T]he rule in question rests upon no such foundation.”). 
 9. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 2.3 
(2002). 
 10. Id.; Fixed Rules, supra note 8, at 466. 
 11. WIGMORE, supra note 7, §§ 2294-2329. 
 12. Id. § 2291. 
 13. See RICE, supra note 1, at § 2:3 n.13 (listing cases); see also Wolfle v. United 
States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (stating the function of marital privilege is to preserve the 
relationship); United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 373 (1980) (denying the creation of a 
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2. The Humanistic Rationale for Evidentiary Privilege 
In more recent years, scholars such as Professor Edward J. 
Imwinkelried have advocated for an alternative, rights-based rationale to 
attorney–client privilege.14 This “non-instrumental” or “privacy-based” 
rationale is predicated on weighting the client’s rights over those of the 
collective15 and is more closely related to the early, honor-based rationale.16 
Imwinkelried calls this a humanistic rationale and argues that it is a more 
compatible with the ideals of the liberal democratic theory upon which the 
United States was built.17 In essence, his logical argument proceeds as 
follows: 
1. Liberal democracies, such as the United States, 
recognize an individual’s right to autonomy. 
2. To exercise and fully engage his autonomy, a 
person must be enabled to make intelligent choices. 
3. To make intelligent choices, a person must be able 
to consult with third parties. 
4. When consulting with third parties, the person 
must retain the ability to make an independent choice. 
                                                                                                             
legislative privilege after weighing societal cost of with functional); United States v. Arthur 
Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984) (stating privilege not needed to assure 
communication between client and accountant); Univ. of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 
182, 189 (1990) (denying the creation of a peer review privilege for educational institutions 
because privilege “must be strictly construed”); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 
(1980) (internal citations omitted); accord Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); 
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
 14. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 2.3. 
 15. See Jack B. Weinstein, Recognition in the United States of the Privilege of Another 
Jurisdiction, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 535, 536 (1956) (“[I]t is unseemly for a man to divulge 
what another was compelled to tell him by the nature of their relationship.”); see generally 
23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
EVIDENCE, § 5422 (1980 & Supp. 2015). 
 16. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 2.3. 
 17. Id. § 5.3.3; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical 
View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 395, 407 (2000) (“Liberal 
democracy is a political system with representative governments elected by popular 
majority, the rule of law enshrined to protect individuals and minorities, and a significant 
sector of economic, associational, and communicative activity that is largely autonomous 
from government control.”). 
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5. To make a fully independent choice, the person 
must be able to trust the third-party to fully inform him. 
6. To trust the third-party, there must be privacy in 
their communications. 
7. Privacy in communications is preserved in our 
legal system through evidentiary privileges. 
8. Therefore, the recognition of an evidentiary 
privilege between an attorney and his client is necessary to 
enable autonomy. 18 
This line of argument is particularly persuasive when considering 
that the relationship functions in a complex legal system where guidance is 
vital for the client.19 The client’s ability to make intelligent choices 
necessitates knowing what those choices are and potential consequences.20 
While there is still a functional aspect to privilege under a humanistic 
viewpoint, the emphasis is on enabling the client rather than the court.21 
3. A Middle-Ground Rationale for Privilege 
A third point of view is that the humanistic and instrumental 
rationales need not be mutually exclusive.22 Each approach assumes that 
circumstances exist in which privilege is needed, and even under a 
humanistic rationale there is a utility to the privilege in enabling the 
exercise of a fundamental right.23 Additionally, if the instrumental rationale 
is truly utilitarian, it should take into consideration the costs to all parties 
involved, including the cost to a client’s rights. If the cost of denying the 
client his right to make informed decisions is greater than the benefit to 
society, then the utilitarian must conclude that privilege should be granted. 
Thus, the distinction between the two rationales may be fairly characterized 
as one of degree rather than kind. 
                                                
 18. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 5.3.3. 
 19. Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 505-06. 
 20. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer As Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1073 (1976). 
 21. Id.; see also RONALD GOLDFARB, IN CONFIDENCE: WHEN TO PROTECT SECRECY 
AND WHEN TO REQUIRE DISCLOSURE 64 (2009); Albert W. Alschuler, The Search for Truth 
Continued, The Privilege Retained: A Response to Judge Frankel, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 67, 
73-74 (1983). 
 22. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5422. 
 23. Note, Modes of Analysis: The Theories & Justifications of Privileged 
Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1484 (1985) [hereinafter Modes of Analysis]. 
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Where one lands on the spectrum between the humanistic and 
instrumental rationales reflects one’s underlying value judgments. For early 
legal scholars such as Bentham or Wigmore, truth was static and 
objective.24 Therefore, confidentiality was nothing more than an obstacle, 
and privilege could only exist if necessary because an individual has no 
right to obstruct justice. This theory, however, requires the assumption that 
the truth is something that can always be objectively determined. 
However, if there are times when “truth is in the eye of the 
beholder,” elevating a duty to the system over the duty to the individual 
undermines the adversarial system itself.25 When privilege is based on a 
duty to the client, confidentiality ensures the client’s right to a fair 
adjudication. This view is more compatible with the attorney’s role of 
“pursu[ing] not the greater good, not what is best for the ‘system,’ not even 
justice, but rather only the client’s cause.”26 
The distinction between the two rationales may make little 
difference in the archetypical attorney–client relationship, such as one when 
an individual contacts an attorney. Under either rationale, the client will 
receive protection over his communication with the attorney and the court 
need not ask whether it is allowing privilege due to a preference for liberal 
democratic or utilitarian ideals. The choice of rationales, however, has 
significant normative implications when the client is a corporation. 
B. Corporate-Entity Theory  
Corporate-entity theory refers to the set of assumptions made 
regarding the nature and purpose of the corporate form. Like the rationale 
behind evidentiary privilege, corporate-entity theory is both descriptive and 
proscriptive. That is, legal scholars use these concepts to explain existing 
doctrine as well as to suggest how doctrine should develop. In his article 
Theories of the Corporation, David Millon notes that historically there has 
been a direct relationship between the theory that society has used to 
describe a corporation and the legal doctrines proscribed to regulate the 
corporation.27 How corporations are described, i.e. what positive theory is 
used to explain the nature of a corporation, gives rise to normative 
implications that can be used to evaluate legal doctrine.28 At the same time, 
                                                
 24. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 3.2.1. 
 25. Lawrence J. Vilardo & Vincent E. Doyle, III, Where Did the Zeal Go?, 38 LITIG. 
53, 57 (2011). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (1990). 
 28. Id. at 241. 
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the normative implications of legal doctrines have influenced corporate 
theory by lending support for one theory over another.29 
1. Early Grant-Based Theory 
Throughout history, regulation of the corporate entity has shifted 
between the public and private spheres of law.30 When the rules controlling 
a corporation emanate from the private agreement of those who formed it, 
the corporation is controlled by private law. When the rules controlling a 
corporation emanate from a sovereign government or monarch, the 
corporation is controlled by public law. The first corporate forms were 
conceived of as an extension of a nation’s sovereign power, governed by 
public law. In medieval England, early corporate forms were authorized to 
exist via a grant from the monarchy for very specific purposes, such as 
developing global trade.31 These entities were considered quasi-public, 
formed for the public good with grants of exclusive power coming directly 
from the government.32 
At the start of the eighteenth century, leaders in the United States 
were skeptical of chartered corporations due to their experiences in Europe, 
where corporations were considered a tool of the oligarchy. Thus, a concern 
over the balance of power and freedom of trade created resistance to 
allowing free incorporation.33 Consequently, the privilege to incorporate 
was available only through a legislative grant and corporations were 
restricted to the specific activities granted.34 
Ironically, this tightly controlled access to the corporate form 
resulted in an aggrandizement of power into the hands of those who had 
access to the legislature. 35 In response, states passed “free incorporation” 
                                                
 29. Id. at 241-42. 
 30. See W. S. Holdsworth, English Corporation Law in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 
31 YALE L.J. 382, 394-96 (1922). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 
HARV. L. REV. 105, 111 (1888); see also 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1999) 
 (“They were, rather, looked upon as public agencies, to which had been entrusted the duty 
of regulating foreign trade, just as the domestic trades were subjected to the government of 
the guilds.”) (citation omitted).  
 33. Note, Incorporating the Republic: The Corporation in Antebellum Political 
Culture, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1883, 1891 (1989) [hereinafter Incorporating the Republic]; see 
Head & Amory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. 127, 169 (1804) (stating that the rights of 
corporations are derived from their enabling acts). 
 34. See Susanna M. Kim, Characteristics of Soulless Persons: The Applicability of the 
Character Evidence Rule to Corporations, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 763, 785 (2000). 
 35. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 
88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 181 (1985). 
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laws to separate the corporate form from legislative function.36 This 
doctrinal shift gave rise to a new question: free of its government charter, 
was the corporation an entity separate and apart from its creators, or was it 
an aggregate of the individuals who formed it?37 
Two competing theories formed along these two possibilities. The 
“aggregate” or “nexus-of-contracts” theory conceptualized the corporation 
as an aggregate organization of private individuals who had mutually 
agreed to engage in the pursuit of profit.38 The “natural entity” theory 
posited that the corporation, which had always been distinct and separate 
from its individual constituents, had evolved into a real entity under the law 
with rights and responsibilities concomitant with that of a natural person.39 
2. Natural-Entity Theory 
As corporations grew larger and their ownership became more 
fragmented, the natural-entity theory appeared to most accurately describe 
the distinct and separate nature of the corporation from the individuals who 
held shares.40 Without a mandate to serve the public good, which had 
traditionally accompanied a government charter, the question arose as to 
how corporations would be held accountable for their actions.41 The theory 
of the corporation as a natural entity answered this question by imbuing the 
corporation with “obligations or responsibilities [no] different from those 
owed by natural persons.”42 This concept of “corporate citizenship” placed 
an affirmative duty on corporate management to consider more than just 
profit.43 
3. Aggregate-Entity Theory 
Under the competing “aggregate” theory, the corporate entity is 
considered a logical outgrowth of partnership and property law principles.44 
                                                
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 182. 
 38. Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional 
Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 109-10 
(2009). 
 39. Id. at 112-13 
 40. Millon, supra note 27, at 216. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 217, 220 (citing E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). 
 44. A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. 
L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932); see also A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 275 (1932). 
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Under this theory, corporate management is a trustee of shareholder 
property and any consideration of interests other than maximizing 
shareholder wealth is inherently incompatible with the nature of the 
corporation.45 Social responsibility is achieved by the corporation pursuing 
what it is most capable of doing: generating wealth. 46 
However, one consequence of restricting corporate actions to those 
that build shareholder wealth is that corporations have “a rational incentive 
to try to externalize the costs of their conduct to society . . . while 
internalizing the resulting excess profits reaped from those shortcuts.”47 As 
a result, public law is necessary to provide the checks and balances needed 
to protect those affected by the externalities created.48 
 
4. Experience Influencing Doctrine 
The serious effect of externalities became evident after a wave of 
corporate takeovers in the mid-twentieth century. It was clear that profit-
maximizing decisions sometimes came at a great cost to employees and 
other constituents.49 Hostile takeovers were often financially profitable for 
the shareholders, and therefore conceptually difficult to fight under an 
aggregate-entity theory. The takeovers resulted in the parceling up of 
companies, the loss of jobs, and the deterioration of geographic economic 
centers.50 In response, state legislatures began passing constituency statutes. 
These laws were expressly designed to give corporate management the 
legal authority to consider interests beyond shareholder wealth-
maximization without fear that they would be sued by the shareholders.51 
Thus, while aggregate-entity theory arguably dominated economic and 
corporate legal scholarship throughout the twentieth century, the doctrinal 
reality was an increasing emphasis on corporate autonomy.52 The recent 
                                                
 45. Millon, supra note 27, at 221. 
 46. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 33 (“[T]here is one and only one social responsibility 
of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so 
long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free 
competition without deception or fraud.”). 
 47. Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collison Course?: The Tension 
Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 
335, 339 (2015). 
 48. Id. at 357. 
 49. Millon, supra note 27, at 232. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David K. Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 
70 BUS. LAW. 1, 13-14 (2015). 
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United States Supreme Court decisions Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission provided a confirmation of 
this evolution. In both of these decisions, the Court built its analysis on the 
assumption that the corporation is a rights-bearing entity. 
5. The Corporation as a Rights-Bearing Entity in Hobby Lobby and Citizens 
United 
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme 
Court built its reasoning on the assumption that the corporation is an entity 
with rights and responsibilities independent of its constituents. In that case, 
the Court held that a corporation may financially support political 
candidates out of corporate funds.53 The decision has fueled the 
characterization of the corporation as a natural entity in legal doctrine. In 
his analysis of the decision, Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo 
Strine predicted the normative implications on legal doctrine: 
[I]f corporations are regarded as having equal rights with 
human beings . . . their managers must have the legal right 
to act with conscience and a regard for the full range of 
concerns that animate flesh-and-blood citizens of the 
United States.54 
Justice Strine further speculates that the combination of free 
political spending and profit maximization will logically lead to a 
weakening of government regulation.55 Without public law controlling the 
corporation’s externalities, society must necessarily turn to the 
corporation’s own moral obligation to control externalities,56 which creates 
a need for management to make decisions autonomously from shareholders. 
In a similar endorsement of the rights-bearing nature of 
corporations, the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby held 
that corporations are persons capable of exercising religion under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).57 Professors Lyman 
Johnson and David Millon noted that the Court’s recognition of 
corporations as persons under RFRA grew out of two implicit assumptions. 
First, the Court accepted the assumption that, under state law, corporations 
are persons distinct and apart from any natural person.58 Second, the Court 
                                                
 53. Strine, supra note 47, at 360-61. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 390. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014). 
 58. Id. 
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accepted the assumption that a corporation can have rights that exist 
separately and distinct from its constituents. Thus, without much analysis of 
the issue, the Supreme Court treated corporations as distinct rights-bearing 
entities.59 
6. Experience Informing Theory 
In hindsight, it is easy to see that the aggregate theory appeared to 
be an accurate description of the corporation because it was confirmed by 
experience of property and partnership law. When corporations became 
private entities apart from government charters, the corporation was a 
hybrid partnership and property. As society’s experience with corporations 
progressed, the concept of the corporation as an aggregate of individuals 
failed to fully encapsulate experience. As Professor Susanna Kim has 
pointed out: 
We regularly observe and interact with corporations as 
entities. We read newspaper accounts of corporate mergers 
and acquisitions, follow lawsuits alleging corporate 
manufacturing of defective products, acknowledge 
corporate gifts to charities and good causes, and remit our 
monthly payments to utility companies. Our own 
experience tells us that corporations are not merely 
fictional creatures. To insist that they are denies the 
empirical reality of their existence.60 
Legal doctrine has since responded by treating the corporate form 
increasingly like a rights bearing entity. 
Other areas of law have also treated corporations as distinct entities 
apart from their constituents.61 Particularly relevant to the issue of privilege, 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13 states, “[a] lawyer 
employed or retained by an organization represents the organization and not 
its directors, officers, or other constituents.”62 Although the aggregate, 
wealth-maximization theory continues to be considered “the dominant 
framework of analysis for corporate law and corporate governance 
                                                
 59. Id. 
 60. Kim, supra note 34, at 786. 
 61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. b (AM LAW INST. 
2000) (“The so-called ‘entity’ theory of organizational representation . . . is now universally 
recognized in American law, for purposes of determining the identity of the direct 
beneficiary of legal representation of corporations and other forms of organizations.”). 
 62. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
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today . . . ,” it is so “despite the absence of legal authority.”63 Modern legal 
doctrine and popular experience strongly suggests that, doctrinally and 
conceptually, “the more sound approach is to view the corporation as a real 
person with separate and independent rights and obligations.”64 
C. The Development of Attorney–Client Privilege for Corporations 
For over 100 years, federal courts, without much analysis, held that 
attorney–client privilege was available for corporate clients.65 In United 
States v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co., one of the earliest decisions 
to consider the issue, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the privilege to apply 
to a corporation, stating that “the desirability of protecting confidential 
communications between attorney and client as a matter of public policy is 
too well known and has been too often recognized by text-books and courts 
to need extended comment now.”66 
The issue did not receive full treatment until 1962, when the 
Northern Illinois District Court held that attorney–client privilege did not 
apply to corporations at all.67 In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas 
Association, Chief Judge William Campbell stated that “a corporation’s 
right to assert the privilege has somewhat generally been taken for granted 
by the judiciary, myself included, without a proper reliance on stare decisis 
or the promulgation anywhere of record of a clear legal analysis of the issue 
involved.”68 Equating privilege to the Fifth Amendment right, Judge 
Campbell reasoned that the attorney–client privilege is “personal in 
nature”69 and that “a corporation which is a mere creature of the state and 
not a natural entity should not, without legislation, be afforded a privilege 
historically created only for natural persons.”70 
Judge Campbell ventured further to say that even if the privilege 
applied, determining who represents the corporation for purposes of 
asserting the privilege would be prohibitively difficult.71 He speculated that 
                                                
 63. Johnson & Millon, supra note 52, at 14-15 (quoting Michael Klausner, Fact and 
Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2013)). 
 64. Kim, supra note 34, at 786-87. 
 65. Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney–Client Privilege: A Study of the 
Participants, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191, 220 (1989). 
 66. United States v. Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336 
 67. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass’n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 772 (N.D. Ill. 1962) 
[hereinafter Radiant Burners I]. 
 68. Id. at 772. 
 69. Id. at 773. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 774-75. 
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the shareholder would be the most likely candidate because it is “only for 
their benefit that a corporation could make claim to the privilege.”72 
Judge Campbell’s reasoning reveals two interesting points. First, he 
rejects privilege for the corporation by characterizing it as personal and 
equating it to the constitutional right against self-incrimination. His choice 
of words sound like he is justifying privilege with a humanistic, rights-
based rationale—despite the fact that Wigmore’s instrumental rationale had, 
by 1962, solidly established itself as a part of the American jurisprudential 
lexicon. Second, the fact that he concluded such a “personal” privilege was 
categorically incompatible with a corporation suggests that he considered 
the corporation as something other than a rights-bearing entity. This is 
further supported in his conjecture that the shareholder was the most likely 
candidate to receive the privilege, because the corporation exists “only for 
their benefit.” 
Judge Campbell’s basic value judgments logically lead to this 
holding. The application of a humanistic evidentiary privilege rationale to 
an aggregate entity results in the conclusion that the corporation should not 
be afforded a privilege over communications because the corporation is a 
nexus of individuals and as a legal construction has no rights. Furthermore, 
should the privilege be applied, it would logically only apply to the 
shareholder, because it is he for whom the corporation exists. Thus, in the 
first opinion to analyze the application of attorney–client privilege to a 
corporate client, Judge Campbell’s fundamental views on privilege and 
corporate entity had a normative impact on his pronouncement of positive 
law. 
Yet, the case did not end there. After allowing for additional 
briefing on the matter, Judge Campbell revisited the issue in a second order. 
He admits that but-for the problem of applying a personal privilege to the 
corporate form, he would personally have preferred to entitle corporations 
to the attorney–client privilege, due to “the large and complex nature of 
business transactions.” 73 Nevertheless, he appears to be constrained to hold 
that evidentiary privilege simply cannot apply to a corporation. 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision.74 The court 
echoed the reasoning of Louisville and Nashville Railroad, pointing out that 
privilege had been available to corporations for more than a century and 
there was no precedent for its rejection.75 The court reasoned that the 
                                                
 72. Id. 
 73. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass’n, 209 F. Supp. 321, 325 (N.D. Ill. 1962) 
[hereinafter Radiant Burners II]. 
 74. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass’n, 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1963) 
[hereinafter Radiant Burners III]. 
 75. Id. 
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generally accepted nature of the issue required an accommodation in the 
rules of the privilege to conform with modern business practices.76 
Unlike the district court, the Seventh Circuit interpreted privilege as 
a public policy consideration rather than a personal right. Shifting the 
rationale to a clearly utilitarian, instrumental view, the court stated that the 
purpose of privilege is “encouraging full disclosure by the client.”77 The 
court disagreed with Judge Campbell that the difficulty in application of 
privilege to a corporate client was dispositive, but did not address whether 
privilege is dependent on the real or impersonal nature of the corporation.78 
The court concluded that “a corporation is entitled to the same treatment as 
any other ‘client’—no more and no less.”79 
The Radiant Burners decision left the conceptual basis for 
corporate attorney–client privilege not much clearer than it was before. The 
court stated that the purpose was instrumental and accepted as established 
the availability of privilege to the corporate entity, without addressing the 
nature of the corporation. While not expressly adopting Judge Campbell’s 
shareholder-dominant view of the corporation, the court apparently saw no 
need to challenge it either. Rather, it stated that a difficulty in determining 
who the client is for purposes of applying privilege was not determinative. 
The key question that was not answered was how privilege could 
incentivize a corporation to communicate with its attorney, as the 
instrumental rationale assumes it does. As it happened, the Eastern District 
Court of Pennsylvania had confronted this logical disjunction head-on 
while the first Radiant Burner decision was pending appeal. 
1. The Control-Group Test 
In City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., the Eastern 
District Court of Pennsylvania also concluded that attorney–client privilege 
extended to corporations but applied several important qualifications that 
largely resolved what Judge Campbell had forecasted would be an 
insurmountable difficulty. The court did so by articulating the “control 
group” test.80 Under this test, communications are privileged when they are 
                                                
 76. Id. at 323. 
 77. Id. (quoting Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 
1962). 
 78. Id. at 322-23. But see id. at 324 (Kiley, J., concurring) (“The corporation does not 
itself have attributes which give rise to the need of intimate advice. . . . It does, however, 
have an economic nature because of which it needs legal advice in the same way that the 
early individual needed, and his contemporary counterpart needs, that advice.”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 
1962). 
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made by an individual who is “in a position to control or even to take a 
substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may 
take upon the advice of the attorney.”81 The reasoning is that when an 
employee is in this position of control, the agent “is (or personifies) the 
corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer.”82 
This test provides a more logically coherent connection between 
the instrumental rationale and the aggregate-entity theory. If privilege exists 
only to the extent that it encourages the client to fully communicate, the 
only individuals with an interest close enough to that of the corporation to 
be influenced by the existence of privilege are the ones in control. Perhaps 
reflecting the dominance of the aggregate-entity theory at the time, most 
federal courts used the control-group test until the 1981 Supreme Court 
decision Upjohn Co. v. United States.83 The Upjohn decision adopted the 
subject-matter test, which had originated in the Seventh Circuit, the same 
circuit that had reversed Judge Campbell some years earlier. 
2. The Subject-Matter Test 
Nearly a decade after the control-group test was used in 
Westinghouse Electric, the Seventh Circuit expanded on its earlier 
reasoning from Radiant Burners II and established an alternative to the 
control-group test.84 Using the “subject-matter test,” the court held that an 
employee’s communications are sufficiently identified with the corporation 
when “(1) the employee makes the communication at the direction of his 
superiors in the corporation” and (2) the subject of the communication is 
“the performance by the employee of the duties of his employment.”85 The 
Eighth Circuit also adopted that test in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. 
Meredith, reasoning that the subject-matter test is more appropriate for 
corporate entities because it shifts the focus away from whom the attorney 
is communicating with to why the attorney is communicating with that 
person,86 thus resolving the problem of determining who adequately 
represents the corporation. 
The subject-matter test may resolve the issue of who represents the 
corporation for purposes of privilege by changing the direction of the 
inquiry, but it does not resolve the incongruity of the instrumental rationale 
                                                
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney–Client 
Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 443, 451 (1982); WRIGHT AND GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5483, 
at 289. 
 84. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977). 
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and the nature of the corporation. Rather, the reduced emphasis on who is 
speaking under the subject-matter test further estranges the relationship 
between providing privilege and creating an incentive to communicate. 
i. Upjohn Company v. United States 
In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court expressly 
declined to establish a broad rule87 but cited the Diversified Industries test 
with approval88 and rejected the control-group test altogether.89 In its 
analysis, the court did not linger on the nature of a corporation, stating only 
that it is “an artificial creature of the law.”90 As for the difficulty of applying 
privilege to a corporate entity, the Court stated it “has assumed that the 
privilege applies when the client is a corporation, and the Government does 
not contest the general proposition.”91 
To explain its departure from the control-group test, the Court 
started with the basic proposition that the purpose of privilege is “to 
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients 
and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and 
administration of justice.”92 The Court went further by reasoning that the 
“privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to 
those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to 
enable him to give sound and informed advice.”93 
The decision in Upjohn rests on three basic assumptions: (1) the 
attorney–client privilege exists for corporations; (2) the privilege is justified 
under a utilitarian theory; and (3) the corporation is an artificial entity. 
While these three assumptions are the same ones that the court in 
Diversified Industries began with, the Court in Upjohn allows for a wider 
scope by enlarging privilege to include consideration of the lawyer’s need 
for information, separate and apart from the client’s need for advice. 
After Upjohn, communications between an attorney and his client’s 
employees are privileged if (1) the communications are made by an 
employee acting as such; (2) the communications were made at the 
direction of corporate superiors for the purpose of securing legal advice 
                                                
 87. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981). 
 88. Id. at 391-92. 
 89. Id. at 394-95. Disagreement exists as to the intended effect of the Court’s holding. 
See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5483; Sexton, supra note 83, at 458-59 (pointing 
out that “the Justices rejected the control group test without embracing the subject matter 
test”). 
90. Upjohn, 449 at 389-90. 
 91. Id. at 390. 
 92. Id. at 389. 
 93. Id. at 390. 
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from counsel; (3) the communications concerned matters within the scope 
of the employee’s corporate duties; and (4) the employee was sufficiently 
aware that he or she was being questioned in order for the corporation to 
obtain legal advice from counsel.94 
3. The Recognized Incongruity Between the Subject-Matter Test and the 
Instrumental-Privilege Theory 
In both Diversified Industries and Westinghouse Electric, 
Wigmore’s instrumental rationale was cited as the “purpose” behind 
evidentiary privilege.95 However, in what may be a late vindication of 
Judge Campbell’s struggle in Radiant Burners, commentators have 
subsequently noted that a strict instrumental rationale is inherently 
incompatible with the subject-matter test.96 A strict instrumental rationale 
would require the corporation to show that “but for” the evidentiary 
privilege it would not communicate openly with its attorney.97 Yet, the 
corporation cannot speak on its own but requires others to speak for it, so 
the incentivizing aspect of the instrumental theory would appear 
inapplicable to the corporation-as-client theory.98 Therefore, assuming the 
instrumental rationale, the control-group test would make more sense for 
determining who is included in corporate attorney–client privilege because 
it is those who control the corporation that are more likely to be influenced 
the existence of privilege.99 
II. CURRENT APPROACHES TO PRIVILEGE WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES 
While the facts in Upjohn included communications between 
former employees and corporate counsel, the Court expressly declined to 
address whether former employees were included within the test, because 
                                                
 94. Id. at 394-95. Some states have retained the control-group test. In these states, 
privilege for communications with former employees is unlikely to apply because a former 
employee never satisfies the control group requirement that he or she be in a position to 
direct corporate action in response to legal advice. Becker, supra note 2, at 889-90; see, e.g., 
Barrett Indus. Trucks, Inc. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 515 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (no 
privilege for former employees under Illinois law because they are not a part of the “control 
group”). Thus, these two subjects are beyond the scope of this note. 
 95. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977); City of 
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1962). 
 96. See, e.g., 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5476; IMWINKELRIED, supra 
note 9, § 6.9.1. 
 97. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2291, at 552. 
 98. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct 1.13 cmt. 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2014). 
 99. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 6.9.1 (citing Alexander, supra note 65, at 415). 
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the issue had not been raised below.100 In a concurring opinion, however, 
Justice Burger stated, “[I]n my view the Court should make clear now, that 
as a general rule, a communication is privileged at least when, as here, an 
employee or former employee speaks at the direction of the management 
with an attorney regarding conduct or proposed conduct within the scope of 
employment.”101 As the cases that follow demonstrate, the lack of a 
conceptual reckoning between corporate theory, privilege rationale, and the 
now-established attorney–client corporate privilege doctrine begins to 
become apparent as evidentiary challenges to communications with former 
employees stretched the doctrine to its logical limits. 
Among jurisdictions that have adopted the subject-matter test, three 
general approaches have arisen to address the issue of privilege for 
communications with a client’s former employees. The first approach is to 
treat them no differently than any other third-party witness.102 The second 
approach construes privilege narrowly but recognizes a legitimate need for 
privilege when investigative, or information gathering, in nature.103 The 
third approach views former employees no differently than current 
employees and treats communications with former employees the same as 
communications with current employees under the Upjohn test.104 
As an initial matter, there does not appear to be any disagreement 
that communications between an attorney and a client’s employee stay 
privileged even after they leave the company.105 In other words, 
communication does not become unprivileged when an employee leaves. 
A. Approach One: No different than any other third-party witness 
Courts that have categorically denied evidentiary privilege over 
communications with former employees have generally done so on the 
basis that a former employee no longer acts as an agent or representative of 
                                                
 100. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 n.3 (1981). 
 101. Id. at 402-03 (J. Burger, concurring) (emphasis added); see also Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 1970) (rejecting control-group test in 
fact pattern that included former employees but not making any distinction in its between 
current and former employees). 
 102. See, e.g., Clark Equipment Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co., No. 82 C 4585, 1985 WL 
2917, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 1985). 
 103. See, e.g., Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 41. 
 104. See, e.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust 
Litig., 658 F.2d 1355, 1361 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 105. EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE 119 (5th ed. 2007) 
(“Whatever communications were privileged communications during the course of the 
former employee’s employment should clearly remain privileged. No reason exists to 
terminate the privilege along with the termination of the employment.”); see also Peralta, 
190 F.R.D. at 38, 41; Infosystems, Inc. v. Ceridian Corp., 197 F.R.D. 303, 306 (E.D. Mich. 
2000). 
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the client corporation.106 In Clark Equipment Co. v. Lift Parts 
Manufacturing Co., the plaintiff claimed attorney–client privilege for 
communications between its attorney and a former employee.107 The 
Northern District Court of Illinois held that the privilege did not apply to 
former employees because “[f]ormer employees are not the client. They 
share no identity of interests in the outcome of the litigation. Their 
willingness to provide information is unrelated to the directions of their 
former corporate superiors, and they have no duty to their former employer 
to provide such information.”108 The court concluded by saying that “it is 
virtually impossible to distinguish the position of a former employee from 
any other third-party witness who might have pertinent information about 
one or more corporate parties to a lawsuit.”109 
In another decision that rested on the lack of an agency 
relationship, the Northern District of California denied privilege over 
information-gathering emails between a bank’s former CEO and the 
attorney for the bank’s trustee during bankruptcy proceedings in 
Schoenmann v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.110 The attorney for the 
Trustee argued that he “was obtaining relevant information from [the 
former CEO] as a former officer to advise and represent the Trustee.”111 The 
court nonetheless denied privilege over the emails, stating, “[The former 
employee] was not communicating with the Trustee and [the Trustee’s] 
counsel to obtain legal advice and was not a client of the Trustee’s 
counsel.”112 
Finally, the technical inability of a former employee to fit within 
the precise wording of Upjohn has prevented some courts from extending 
attorney–client privilege. In Infosystems, Inc. v. Ceridian Corp., the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied the extension of privilege 
to a former employee because it interpreted Upjohn as setting a strict 
                                                
 106. See EPSTEIN, supra note 105, at 168 (stating opinion that privilege should not 
apply because “the former employee is . . . no longer an agent for the corporation and 
occupies a position no different than that of any stranger.”). 
 107. Clark, 1985 WL 2917, at *5. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. Contra Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491 (role of 
employee during employment is not equivalent to that of a bystander witness); Diversified 
Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977). 
 110. Schoenmann v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 7 F. Supp.3d 1009, 1015 (2014). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.; see also Allen, Adams & Co. v. Harrison, 30 Vt. 219, 221 (1858) (no privilege 
because former employee not a party to the suit); Connolly Data Sys., Inc. v. Victor Tech., 
Inc., 114 F.R.D. 89, 94 (S.D. Cal. 1987) (no attorney–client privilege for former employee 
under California law because no longer representative of the company); Nakajima v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 857 F. Supp. 100, 105 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding no privilege for former 
employee under D.C. law because former employee not seeking legal advice). 
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requirement that communications be made “at the direction of corporate 
superiors.”113 Thus, once again, the court appears to deny privilege on the 
lack of an agency relationship. Reaching a similar conclusion as the Clark 
Equipment decision, the court stated that “[c]ounsel’s communications with 
a former employee of the client corporation generally should be treated no 
differently from communications with any other third-party fact witness.”114 
The Infosystems court did, however, qualify its denial by leaving 
open the possibility that the moving party could show that the 
communicating ex-employee had a “present connection or agency 
relationship with the client corporation,” or that the communication 
“concerns a confidential matter that was uniquely within the knowledge of 
the former employee.”115 Because the defendant had not shown any special 
circumstances or even submitted the materials at issue for an in camera 
review, the court denied the motion for a protective order.116 
B. Approach Two: A qualified privilege for investigative 
communications 
The second approach recognizes a corporation’s need for 
information but distinguishes former employees on the basis that they lack 
a duty to the employer. Under this approach, courts have extended privilege 
over the attorney’s information-gathering communications but not over pre-
deposition counseling. In Peralta v. Cendant Corp., the District Court for 
the District of Connecticut considered a pre-deposition communication 
between the defendant’s attorney and former employee.117 Following the 
lead of Clark Equipment, the court stated categorically that Upjohn could 
not be applied wholesale to former employees because the former employee 
has no duty to provide the information sought.118 
The court in Peralta did leave open the possibility that investigative 
communications may be covered under certain circumstances, “if the nature 
and purpose . . . was to learn facts related to [the case] that [the former 
employee] was aware of as a result of her employment.”119 The test, the 
court said, should be “Did the communication relate to the former 
employee’s conduct and knowledge, or communication with defendant’s 
                                                
 113. Infosystems, 197 F.R.D. at 305 (citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394). 
 114. Id. at 306. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.; See also Shew v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 714 A.2d 664, 670 (Conn. 1998) 
(holding no privilege unless special circumstances shown under Connecticut law). 
 117. Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 190 F.R.D. 38, 39 (D. Conn. 1999). 
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counsel, during his or her employment?”120 Several federal district courts 
have since adopted the Peralta test.121 
C. Approach Three: Privilege allowed under subject-matter test 
Under the third approach, courts view former employees no 
differently than current employees. These courts extend privilege to 
communications with former employees to the same extent as current 
employees under the subject-matter test. Both the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals follow this approach.122 
In In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products 
Antitrust Litigation, the District Court for the Central District of California 
issued an order holding a corporate attorney’s pre-deposition “orientation 
sessions” unprotected by attorney–client privilege. The district court had 
reasoned that the opposing party must be able to “make full inquiry into the 
influences that may have affected the testimony.”123 The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the communications were protected 
under Upjohn: 
Former employees, as well as current employees, may 
possess the relevant information needed by corporate 
counsel to advise the client with respect to actual or 
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 121. See Gioe v. AT&T Inc., No. CV 09-4545 (LDW)(AKT), 2010 WL 3780701, at *2 
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340 F. Supp. 2d 554, 557-58 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
 122. See In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 1997); In re Coordinated Pretrial 
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lower courts have followed this lead. See, e.g., Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. 
of Arizona, 881 F.2d 1486, 1493 (9th Cir. 1989) (for investigative purposes); Goswami v. 
DePaul Univ., No. 12 C 7167, 2014 WL 1307585, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2014); Cool v. 
BorgWarner Diversified Transmission Prod., Inc., No. IP 02-960-C(B/S), 2003 WL 
23009017, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 2003) (citing “need to know” logic); Al-Turki v. Fenn, 
No. 89 CIV.6217 LMM THK, 1995 WL 231278, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1995); United 
States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253, 260 (C.D. Cal. 1982) disapproved on other grounds, 
United States v. Zolin, 842 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Worldwide Wholesale Lumber, 
Inc., 392 B.R. 197, 203 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2008). 
 123. Id. at 1359. 
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potential difficulties. . . . The orientation sessions 
undoubtedly provided information which will be used by 
corporate counsel in advising the companies how to handle 
the pending lawsuits.”124 
The court also noted that Upjohn forbade discovery of what was 
said in the sessions regardless of whether the attorneys were acting as 
counsel for the employees at the deposition.125 
In In re Allen, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also extended 
privilege under the Upjohn subject-matter test to investigative 
communications with a former employee.126 The court cited the 
instrumental rationale for the attorney–client privilege, stating that 
attorneys “need . . . to know all that relates to the client’s reasons for 
seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out.”127 
Using this reasoning, the court held that the Upjohn analysis applied 
equally to former employees.128 
III. THE TENSION BETWEEN EVIDENTIARY THEORY, CORPORATE 
THEORY, AND CORPORATE ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE DOCTRINE 
So what is the proper scope of corporate attorney–client privilege 
for former employees? The answer depends on how we justify privilege and 
characterize corporations. If we accept that the instrumental rationale 
justifies privilege and that corporations are real entities, privilege arguably 
should not apply to corporations at all or, at most, the control-group test 
should be used. Under the control-group test, privilege for communications 
with former employees will never be privileged. 
If we accept the instrumental rationale to justify privilege and the 
aggregate-entity theory for corporations, we reach a similar result. As Judge 
Campbell held, the difficulty of determining who within an aggregate of 
individuals is capable of holding privilege for the corporation may prove 
prohibitively difficult. As a compromise, we can allow those in a position 
capable of acting on legal advice to hold privilege as the closest proxy for 
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 125. Id. at 1361. 
 126. In re Allen, 106 F.3d at 606. 
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the group. In this scenario, the control-group test once again makes more 
sense and former employees will be precluded. 
Both of these scenarios suggest that current corporate attorney–
client doctrine is simply incompatible with the instrumental rationale. One 
option, therefore, is to reverse Upjohn. This would be a triumph of theory 
over experience. If theory is the basis on which doctrine is built and 
doctrine accurately fits our experience, then logically we must question 
what our theory has become. 
A. Experience Informing Theory: Reverse Engineering Upjohn 
In A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney–Client 
Privilege, John Sexton points out that the Upjohn Court employed a 
“functional mode of analysis.”129 The decision “focuses primarily on the 
perceived purposes of the privilege.”130 If theory is the basis upon which 
doctrine is built, Upjohn started from the top down. The Court stated that 
the purpose of privilege is “to encourage full and frank communications 
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public 
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.”131 
According to Sexton, this function is ultimately about enhancing the flow of 
information.132 
At first blush, this sounds very much like the instrumental theory, 
in that privilege is being used to encourage communication. However, a 
strict application of the instrumental rationale requires that privilege be the 
but-for cause for communication. As recognized earlier, the instrumental 
rationale is largely inapplicable in the context of a corporation because non-
party employees do not need an incentive to obey their superior’s request 
for information. In Upjohn, privilege is seen as a necessity but not because 
the information wouldn’t otherwise be given by the speaker. Rather, it is a 
necessity because the information might not otherwise be sought by the 
corporation. 
The Court in Upjohn put great weight on an attorney’s “need to 
know” the information that lower-level employees had.133 Starting with the 
statement that “it will frequently be employees beyond the control 
group . . . who will possess the information needed by the corporation’s 
lawyers,”134 the Court effectively carved out an “enclave of privacy” in 
which that information could be transferred. By doing so, the Court was 
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focused on the flow of information, without consideration of whether the 
evidentiary rationale would actually constitute but-for causation on the 
employee’s decision to speak. Thus, the Court cites Wigmore’s traditional 
rationale as the basis for evidentiary privileges, while granting privilege to 
encourage the client’s obtaining information rather than giving information. 
One possible reason for this is that the Court was enabling the real entity of 
the corporation to effectively access its “corporate knowledge.” To draw an 
anthropomorphic analogy, the corporate head needs to know what the hand 
is doing, or has done, to make fully informed decisions. Implicit and 
necessary in the application of privilege to current employees is an 
assumption that the corporation has some right to the information in the 
first place. 
This shift moves away from the communicator as holder of the 
privilege and towards a paradigm in which the information is treated as 
corporate property.135 This is a logical extension of the long recognized 
doctrine that confidential business information is protectable property.136 
Although the individual and the corporate entity are not physically the 
same, the law has created legal fictions to bridge the gap.137 In the context 
of an attorney–client privilege for individuals, making a distinction between 
the holder of information and the owner of information is unnecessary. 
When those roles are split, however, the instrumental rationale no longer 
functions. 
The other function that Sexton extrapolated from the Upjohn was 
that the Court saw privilege as increasing corporate compliance with the 
law.138 As Sexton notes, this assumption relies on the concept of voluntary 
compliance as opposed to external regulation and implies a confidence that 
corporations will adequately self-regulate.139 Self-regulation, or voluntary 
internalization of externalities, in turn invokes a private law, entity-based 
conception of the corporation. This again suggests that the Upjohn opinion 
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rests on an assumption that a corporation is an entity that can take into 
account constituents other than its shareholders: a natural-entity theory. 
After deconstructing Upjohn, we find support for the real-entity 
theory of the corporation and a rights-based justification for privilege. 
Accepting both of these theories, the subject-matter test is conceptually 
complete. Privilege is extended to enable the entity to exercise its right to 
obtain full legal advice. Under this paradigm, communications with former 
employees should be protected to the same extent as communications with 
current employees. 
A fourth possible paradigm exists that is worth noting. We could 
accept, as was implicitly done in Upjohn, that a rights-based rationale more 
accurately describes experience, and accept the aggregate-entity theory of 
the corporation. This appears to be the source of Wright’s criticism that the 
corporation cannot obtain a rights-based privilege because corporations “are 
not ‘persons’ in the same, full sense as individuals with moral views.”140 
However, as previously discussed, experience tells us that corporations 
already are treated as “moral” entities and have been viewed as rights 
holders in many other contexts.141 
B. Scope of Application to Former Employees 
Assuming that privilege should extend to former employees, the 
question logically arises as to what the scope should be. Peralta and its 
progeny allowed for the possibility of privilege but only when the 
communications were information-gathering in nature. Is this cautious 
approach better? 
While a narrow construction of privilege rules has been generally 
accepted since the time of Bentham and Wigmore,142 Sexton concludes that 
Upjohn “commands that a broader, overprotective rule be chosen when it is 
difficult or impossible to determine whether the risks flowing from 
overprotection are greater or less than the risks flowing from 
underprotection.”143 He bases this conclusion on two principles. First, he 
notes that the principle of maximizing benefits and minimizing costs would 
favor flexible rules that conform to the facts of each circumstance.144 
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Second, he notes that the rule must be sufficiently definite so that attorneys 
and clients know when their communication is protected.145 The benefits 
that led the Court in Upjohn to confer protection over communications with 
employees—full communication and voluntary compliance—accrue at the 
time of communication, whereas the costs of the privilege are speculative 
and theoretical.146 Therefore, preferring over-inclusive rules is preferable to 
under-inclusive rules.147 
The fear of expanding privilege has its root in the function of 
privilege as an exception to a general rule of disclosure. Peralta and its 
progeny reasoned that an over inclusive rule extending privilege to former 
witnesses would allow for the influence of witnesses who were essentially 
third parties to the litigation.148 However, the subject-matter test does not 
grant a formalistic privilege based merely on membership in a certain class 
of individuals, as employees who did not have any involvement beyond 
being a mere witness would not normally be given privilege in the first 
place.149 Additionally, former employees that qualify under the Upjohn 
principles will likely be those who “(1) posses[ed] decisionmaking (sic) 
responsibility regarding the matter about which legal help is sought, (2) 
[were] implicated in the chain of command relevant to the subject matter of 
the legal services, or (3) [were] personally responsible for or involved in the 
activity that might lead to liability for the corporation.”150 In this regard, a 
former employee could have more commonality of interest than current 
employees.151 Because the function of Upjohn was to ensure that the 
corporation had access to a free flow of information, “[w]hat should be of 
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concern is the status of that person at the time and in relation to the events 
communicated.”152 
Furthermore, there is a legitimate argument to be made that 
attorneys should be allowed to communicate in confidence with former 
employees prior to a deposition. While it is true that a former employee no 
longer personifies the corporate entity, their testimony regarding knowledge 
obtained within the scope of employment has the potential of implicating 
the corporation. Part of an attorney’s responsibility is to provide guidance to 
the client regarding the legal consequences of the client’s words.153 Without 
the guidance of legal counsel, a former employee “may make unintended 
admissions due to his lack of sophistication in the deposition process.”154 
Finally, drawing the line between information-gathering 
communications and counseling communications would often be 
prohibitively difficult. The court in Petroleum Products protected pre-
deposition orientation sessions in part on the reasoning that the attorneys 
likely gathered information related to the representation during the 
sessions.155 Thus, limiting privilege to the scope of “information gathering” 
would muddy the waters rather than provide an easy guide for attorneys. As 
Justice Rehnquist stated in Upjohn, “[a]n uncertain privilege is little better 
than no privilege at all.”156 
CONCLUSION 
Extending the subject-matter test to cover communications between 
a corporation’s attorney and former employee is preferable because it 
allows for the corporation to make autonomous, fully informed legal 
decisions. It also serves an instrumental purpose by encouraging 
corporations to conduct self-evaluative investigations in order to stop or 
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prevent harmful activity.157 These advantages outweigh the possibility that a 
“zone of silence”158 will result from protecting the communications. 
Under the real-entity theory of corporations, it would make little 
sense to impede the free flow of information within the corporation to its 
legal advisors. Regardless of whether the individual holding the information 
is currently in an active agency relationship, information gathered during 
employment “belongs” to the corporation and might be attributable to the 
corporation.159 When an attorney needs this information to give competent 
representation, he should be able to talk with the former employee without 
concern. This is precisely what the subject-matter test and the Upjohn 
function analysis does with current employees.160 
In the case of former employees, it is sufficient that (1) the 
communication be made by a current or former employee, (2) to corporate 
counsel, (3) regarding matters within the scope of the current or former 
employee’s corporate duties, and (4) the current or former employee is 
aware that he or she is communicating in order for the corporation to obtain 
legal counsel. 
Embracing the view that corporations are rights-bearing entities 
with the right to make autonomous decisions regarding legal action allows a 
workable framework for understanding why communication with 
employees and former employees alike should be given privilege when the 
communication concerns information within the scope of the individual’s 
current or former employment. While the concept of extending autonomy to 
a corporation may seem strange at first, it is no different than personifying 
the corporate form through giving it rights to own property, exercise 
religion, or make political donations.161 Giving a rights-based privilege to 
corporate communications with counsel would correct the conceptual 
fallacies that have developed under current doctrine and consequently 
clarify the scope of privilege with a client entity’s former employees. 
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